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The article investigates the existence of market externalities due to increasing
returns to marketing. Panel data on 198 pairs of maize markets in Zambia and
correlated random effects linear and tobit estimators were used to model the
relationship between market externalities and producer-to-wholesale marketing
margins. This article is one of the first to explicitly account for unobserved local
market heterogeneity in a developing country context. The results suggest that
Zambian smallholder maize markets are substantially specialized with significant
margin-reducing own externality effects and insignificant cross-externality effects.
The results also indicate that the unobserved market effects exert a systematic
influence on this relationship, a phenomenon that is impossible to measure with
cross-sectional data.
1. Introduction 
A salient feature of food marketing systems in developing countries is that supplies
originate from large numbers of small farmers distributed over wide geographical
areas, who individually produce very small surpluses. High transaction costs of trading
result when traders must transact with many actors for small volumes. This situation
may contribute to a “catch-22” situation whereby smallholder farmers’ incentives to
produce surpluses for the market are impeded by a lack of trader presence in the
area, and trader presence is limited by small surplus production and hence high
transaction costs per unit purchased (Shaffer et al., 1983). A common manifestation
of the apparent market-wide inefficiency is the wide margins between consumer and
producer prices (see, for example, Ahmed and Rustagi, 1984; Kherallah et al., 2002).
It is widely believed that transaction costs could be reduced by initiatives that
facilitate the bulking up of farmers’ surpluses, which would then allow marketing
firms to spread their fixed costs over larger volumes. Forms of collective action,
such as marketing cooperatives, are often viewed as instruments for resolving
marketing problems in developing countries. Often ignored, however, is the fact
that the degree to which bulking can reduce transaction costs depends on whether
there exist local market externalities and scale economies. Because of high fixed
costs in marketing, there often are multiple Pareto-ranked market equilibrium
points, some of which are devoid of such market externalities (Emran and Shilpi,
2002). Thus, the existence of market economies is not guaranteed and is largely
an empirical issue. If, however, such economies do exist, they can potentially be
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passed along to producers and consumers in the form of higher producer prices
and lower marketing margins.
While a number of studies have looked at increasing returns in agricultural
markets of developing countries (Emran and Shilpi, 2002; Fafchamps et al., 2003),
empirical evidence is still scarce on the effects of aggregate supplies on marketing
margins. In their cross-country comparative study, Fafchamps et al., (2003) used
data generated from trader surveys in Benin, Madagascar and Malawi to measure
the presence of increasing returns in agricultural trade. Their framework uses the
trader as the unit of observation and the quantities of output that he/she handles
as a source of market economies. In this sense, the authors sought to determine
if there was scope for concentration of marketing functions among a few efficient
firms. This framework, however, does not account for variations across markets
in the volume of trade or other local market-specific conditions. 
The question of the possible existence of the externality effects of local market
surpluses was first addressed by Emran and Shilpi (2002) in their study of the
Bangladesh rice and vegetable markets. While recognizing the importance of the
relationship between producer and consumer prices in identifying local market
externality effects, owing to data limitations, Emran and Shilpi (2002) approached
the problem rather indirectly and modelled the relationship between the surpluses
in the local markets and the sales decisions of the households located in those
market areas. Like Fafchamps et al., (2003), Emran and Shilpi (2002) used cross-
sectional data on market participants, which do not lend themselves to
comprehensive treatment of unobserved market heterogeneity. Insights from the
new institutional economics literature indicate that transaction costs are unique
to each market participant and, thus, form a basis for participant-specific
heterogeneity (Sadoulet and de Janury, 1995).1
This article uses the unique opportunity presented by panel data on Zambia’s
smallholder farmers and district markets to determine the existence of local market
externalities and their effects on farm-retail marketing margins. Panel data, unlike
the more common cross-sectional data, provide the opportunity to explicitly
account for unobserved market heterogeneity. Maize presents an important case
study as it is the single most important food and cash crop in many sub-Saharan
African countries such as Zambia. 
We use the correlated random effects (CRE) linear and tobit frameworks to
model the price spread between rural markets and district markets as a function of
per capita own and cross externality effects, proxies for cost of trade (distance to
nearest district town; and average wage rate), a proxy for the level of activity and
dependency on local markets as sources of staples (median household expenditure
on staple food crops), and location/district dummy variables. In this framework, the
distribution of the price spread is censored at zero because a positive price spread
is a necessary but insufficient condition for trade to flow from rural market areas to
district centres. Pollack and Wales’ (1991) likelihood dominance criterion (LDC)
showed that the CRE Tobit formulation was 30 times more likely than the alternative
CRE linear regression model that uses a trade dummy variable to specify different
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relationships for positive and negative price spreads. 
The results indicate that Zambian local maize markets are characterised by
significant margin-reducing own externality effects (i.e., higher surplus maize
production within a market catchment area is associated with lower spatial price
spreads) and insignificant cross-externality effects (i.e., higher surplus production
of other commodities has no effect on maize price spreads). The results also
suggest the existence of significant unobserved market heterogeneity on the price
spread, which is not possible to detect in cross-sectional studies.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. We look at the agricultural
marketing policy in Zambia in section 2. We then discuss the methods and
estimation procedures in section 3. We analyse the results in section 4 and
conclude the article in section 5. 
2. Agricultural marketing policy in Zambia
Since Zambia achieved its independence in 1964, a prominent goal of government
policy has been to promote smallholder welfare, primarily through the use of maize
production incentives. The state initially invested heavily in crop-buying depots,
first through the National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD) and later
through the Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF). Government funded extension
services, seed research, and fertilizer subsidies (used mainly on maize) which
resulted in a continued rise in output and yield per hectare. However, by the late
1980s, treasury costs of state fertilizer and maize marketing operations were so
large that they contributed to macroeconomic instability and hyperinflation (Jansen
and Muir, 1994). The government was forced to begin to reform the input and crop
marketing systems and policies. This was fuelled by increased donor pressure.
This included discontinuation of consumer subsidies on maize meal. 
With the continuing desire for market stabilization, the Zambian government
established the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) in 1995. Unlike its predecessor,
NAMBOARD, which was the sole buyer and seller of grain in Zambia, the FRA was
originally created to hold buffer stocks in order to dampen price variability. FRA was also
to provide liquidity in the maize market during the initial years of liberalisation. Although
FRA’s original mandate did not include a price support function, it was soon instructed
to purchase maize in remote areas where production was unlikely to be profitable under
commercial conditions, as well as to distribute fertilizer (Govereh et al., 2002). 
FRA involvement in the buying and selling of grain was very limited until the
2000/2001 marketing season, and all purchases and sales were done using a tender
process. With an increase in budgetary support from the government and the looming
drought of 2001/2002, the FRA progressively became one of the major actors in the
maize market. It started announcing maize floor prices and was declared ‘buyer of last
resort’. Starting in May 2005, the FRA began ramping up its buying activities and has
continued to buy a large portion of local production, now approximately 34% of the
country’s domestically marketed maize. Thus, the government has arguably become
the dominant player in the maize market. Although the private sector is encouraged
to participate alongside the public sector, in reality it is prevented from doing so by the
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unpredictability of government actions. These include discretionary export bans and
restrictions, import tariff rates, and government import programmes. Recent
assessments of the effects of the enacted marketing reforms have been mixed. Some
scholars argue that citing private sector failure in a free market system fails to account
for the role that effective, incentive-enhancing governments can and must play. Even
the most ardent advocates of liberalisation agree that governments need to perform
certain tasks in order for agricultural markets to function effectively. These tasks
include providing a stable and transparent policy environment, investing in public
goods to reduce the costs and risks of trade and production, providing appropriate
institutions for contract enforcement, risk-mitigation, and incentives for investment. 
3. Methods and procedures
The net price for a rural market is often computed as the selling price in the
destination market, p cj, less the purchase price in the local market, pj, unit
transportation costs, and marginal quality verification costs. The quality verification
cost is assumed to be a function of the quantity of all other commodities bought,
hence representing a possible source of diseconomies to scope. This allows
modelling the price spread between the destination markets and the local markets,
pcj - p, as a function of distance (dj), quantity of the commodity in question (qj), and
the quantities of all other surplus commodities in the local market (Q-j): 
pcj - pj = g(dj, qj, Q-j).    (1)
In this framework, own and cross externality effects exist if the price spread,
pcj - pj, is inversely and significantly related to qj and Q-j, respectively (Emran and
Shilpi, 2002). 
Due to the fixed costs that characterize local markets in developing countries,
the intermediary will be able to offer a higher price for commodity j the larger the
aggregate supply of the commodity itself (qj) and the larger the aggregate supply
of all other commodities, Q-j, that she can pool together from the local market.
According to Emran and Shilpi (2002) the existence of fixed costs and externalities
implies that there could be multiple equilibria associated with different levels of
market development. Three distinct stages of market development can be
discerned in developing countries. 
In the first, rural markets are isolated, market clearing occurs at the local level,
marketable surpluses are very low and economies are virtually absent. In the
second stage, long-range marketing intermediaries are in operation but need to
pull together multiple commodities to cover the fixed costs. The third and final
stage involves marketable surpluses that are large enough for each commodity to
permit commodity-wise specialization. Thus, the last stage is associated only with
own externalities. The stage at which a particular market is will directly affect the
impacts of the withdrawal of state buying stations from rural areas and other forms
of market restructuring that cause price relationships to be influenced by high fixed
costs of trading. For most developing countries, this knowledge may be important
Increasing Returns to Marketing in Zambian Maize Markets
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in explaining the performance of the market and in arriving at informed and
practical policy instruments to accelerate market development.
The price spread can be negative, equal to zero, or positive. Just over 82% of the
local-destination market combinations had positive price spreads in our sample. In
general, trade will flow from the local market to the destination market if pcj - pj is
greater than zero and sufficiently large to offset the marketing costs involved. Equation
(1) can be operationalized in two alternative frameworks, depending on the
assumptions made about the behaviour of trade flows for the commodity in question
when the price spread is negative. Considering that local markets are generally
regarded as centres of production and district markets as demand points, it is
traditional to assume that no trade will be observed when pcj - pj<0, rendering the
dependent variable censored at zero. This fits the description of a variable that can
be modelled with a Tobit model. Because of the need to account for unobserved
market heterogeneity, we use an unobserved effects Tobit specification.3
yit = max (0, xitβ + ci + εit),    (2)
where yit = pcit - pit is the price spread between the destination market and the ith
local market, or CSA, in time t, ci ~ (0,σc2) is an unobserved, time-invariant local market
effect, εit ~ (0,σc2) is the idiosyncratic random error term, xit is a vector of explanatory
variables containing all the relevant elements on the right-hand side of equation (1)
plus regional and time dummy variables, and β is a parameter vector to be estimated. 
Alternatively, if we assume that enough effective demand exists in the rural
markets so much so that trade reverses when pcit - pit < 0, then the dependent
variable in equation (1) is uncensored, leading to a more traditional unobserved
effects linear regression model:
yit = xitβ + ci + εit,    (3)
where yit = pcit - pit, xit, ci, εit, and β are as defined in equation (2). It is important
to recognize in this case that the relationship could be different when yit >0,
compared to when yit >_ 0. Thus, we include a trade dummy variable in xit equal to
1 if yit >_ 0, and zero otherwise. Models (2) and (3) are non-nested as neither is a
special case of the other. While equation (3) is linear in the parameters, equation
(2) is inherently non-linear.
Two aspects complicate the identification of the own and cross externalities:
endogeneity of explanatory variables due to simultaneity; and the omitted variable
problem due to unobserved individual effects. Endogeneity is not expected to be a big
problem because our model is at a level higher than the household – at the local market
or CSA level. However, care was taken to ensure that the right-hand-side variables
were appropriately defined (see variable construction sub-section below; and Table 1).
Panel data models are based on the premise that most of the omitted
variables are individual-specific and time-invariant, represented in the standard
panel data model by an unobservable variable, ci Two frameworks can be used to
Gelson Tembo and Thomas S. Jayne
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operationalize models that include unobserved heterogeneity. One assumes that
ci is a random variable that adds to the random error term, and the other assumes
it is a parameter that needs to be estimated. The random effects framework is the
most efficient if the unobserved effect is not correlated with the explanatory
variables, Cov(xit, ci) = 0, but is inconsistent if significant correlation exists. The
fixed effects FE estimator is usually the most practical way to control for time-
constant unobservable characteristics, since doing so requires no assumption
regarding the correlation between observable determinants, xit, and unobservable
heterogeneity, ci. However, in our case this is problematic since the FE tobit
estimator is known to be inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2002).4 The FE estimator also
has the disadvantage of not permitting estimation of the individual time invariant
effects, both observed and unobserved. 
We use the more general correlated random effects estimator (Chamberlain,
1984; Mundlak, 1978), which explicitly accounts for unobserved heterogeneity
and its correlation with observables, while yielding a fixed-effects like
interpretation. The correlated random effects (CRE) estimator, unlike standard
random effects, allows for correlation between ci and xit across all time periods by
assuming that the correlation takes the form ci = α + 
_
xi γ +ai,5 where
_
x is a vector
of time-averaged data on time-variant elements of xit, t=1,…, T, α and γ are
parameters to be estimated, and αi is an error term with a normal distribution,
ai ǀ xi ~ N(0,σ
2
a ).6 . In practice a reduc ed form of the model is estimated where τ is
absorbed into the intercept term and 
_
xi are added to the set of explanatory variab -
les. A Wald test rejected the hypothesis of zero correlation (H0 : γ = 0) between
unobserved heterogeneity and explanatory variables indicating that the CRE
approach is superior to the pooled or random effects estimators. Pollack and Wales’
(1991) likelihood dominance criterion (LDC) was used to identify between the two
alternative models (Equation 2 and Equation 3) the one that best fits our data.
The random effects tobit procedure in Stata, which uses an adaptive
quadrature approximation to the likelihood integrated over the random effect
ai ǀ xi ~ N(0,σ
2
a ), was used to jointly estimate θ = {α, β, γ}, σ 2a and σ 2ε. A quadrature
check using indicated that the approximation was very stable with relative
differences as low as 10-9 % when the number of quadrature points was varied. As
a way to check the robustness of the estimates of the random effects tobit model,
a pooled tobit model was also estimated. Heteroskedasticity, found to be
significant by the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test (χ2(1) = 13.74;p - value
<0.001, was corrected by using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.7
We used the value of the log-likelihood out of the cross-sectional time series FGLS
to do a model selection test with Pollack and Wales’ (1991) LDC. In both equations (2)
and (3), the validity of the CRE specification was tested by testing the hypothesis that
H0 :γ = 0 (Wooldridge 2002). Variance inflation factors (VIFs) showed that
multicollinearity was not a major problem in our data. With the exception of own and
cross externality variables, which had VIFs between 6 and 8, the rest of the variables
had VIFs that were less than three, all of which were comfortably below the cutoff point
of 10. The mean VIF across all variables was also only equal to about two.
Increasing Returns to Marketing in Zambian Maize Markets
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Marginal effects
Because the Tobit model is inherently nonlinear in the coefficients, its estimated
parameters do not by themselves represent the marginal effects of the explanatory
variables on the dependent variable. Instead, the marginal effects are functions of
both the parameters and the data. Skipping the algebraic details, it has been
shown that the marginal effect of a variable xit on the dependent variable yit can
be computed (McDonald and Moffit, 1980; Shapiro et al., 1990; Wooldridge, 2002;
Greene, 2000) as:
(4)
where Ф(zit) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function evaluated
at z = xβ__σ , E(Yit)is the unconditional expected value of yit, and E(yit ǀ yit >0) is the
expected value of yit given that y is above zero. Equation (4) implies that the overall
effect of a small change in an explanatory variable can be decomposed into:
a) the change in the price spread in those markets with positive price spreads,
weighted by the probability of the price spread being above zero; and 
b) the change in the probability of the price spread being above zero, weighted
by the expected value of the price spread when in fact it is above zero
This ability to unpack the overall effect makes it easier to interpret the
marginal effects and has an inherent intuitive appeal. 
Data sources and variable construction
This study used a number of data sources to empirically estimate equations (2)
and (3). Key among them was a nationally representative two-period panel data
set on Zambia’s smallholder farmers. The panel dataset consists of 2001 and
2004 supplemental surveys to the 1999/2000 post-harvest survey. The two
surveys, conducted by the Zambia Central Statistical Office (CSO) with financial
and technical support from Michigan State University's Food Security Research
Project (FSRP), were administered to the same (n=6,922) households in 2001
and 2004, respectively. The two surveys were based on a sample that was
drawn using a multi-stage cluster sampling scheme in which Census
Supervisory Areas (CSAs) were selected within districts, and standard
enumeration areas (SEAs) were selected within CSAs, both using probability
proportional to size (PPS). Households within SEAs were selected using
systematic random sampling.8 The two surveys collected a wealth of agricultural,
economic, and socio-demographic information on the smallholder households
and their local markets, including crop production and sales, livestock production
and sales, income from vegetable and fruit sales, expenditure on staple food
crops, off-farm incomes, and remittances. 
Several local market-level variables were constructed from the household data
contained in these longitudinal household surveys. Because sufficient observations
Gelson Tembo and Thomas S. Jayne
147
zambia journal edition 2_Layout 1  26/09/2011  20:46  Page 147
were sometimes lacking at the SEA level, the CSA was used to represent the local
market.9 There were 198 local CSA-level markets in both marketing years of the
analysis, 2000/01 and 2003/04. Crop prices in the local markets, pj, were estimated
as the median of the prices received by the individual households in the CSA, where
for each commodity the household-level price was taken as the price received at the
largest sale.10 Over 80 % of these transactions occurred within the first 4 months
after harvest. As prices were reported in volumetric terms (per 50 kg bag, per 90 kg
bag, per 20 litre tin, etc.), standard conversion factors were used to convert them to
standard weight units (per kg).11 Because of the fact that we use two time periods, the
nominal prices were converted to their real equivalents.12 Surpluses of the commodity
of interest (own externality variable, qj) and surpluses of all other field crops (cross
externality variable, Q-j) were computed as the sum of individual household surpluses
divided by the number of producers in the CSA. While qj was measured in metric
tons (per capita) Q-j, was measured in monetary terms as the latter involved
aggregating over many different commodities. All monetary variables derived from
survey data were normalized in terms of 2004 Kwacha and then converted to 2004
US dollars (US$) to facilitate interpretation of the estimated marginal effects.
The unit cost of moving commodities from the local market to the nearest
destination market was represented in our empirical specification by the vector dj,
which comprised variables such as median wage rates, median land rental cost,
and the distance to the nearest district town. In addition to explicitly taking the
CSA-level heterogeneity into account through ci we also account for the fact that
districts are unique in their market infrastructure endowment, proximity to major
market outlets such as Lusaka, agro-ecological conditions, and several other
aspects, by including district dummy variables.
Table 1. Descriptions of variables used in the empirical models
Variable Variable description
Rpsp Farm-retail price spread (US$/metric ton)
Medec Median expenditure on staple foods (‘000 US$)
Aqci Per capita maize sales in metric tons (own externality)
Vaqqci Sales of all other crops in ‘000 US$ per capita (cross externality)
Awagec Average wage rate (US$/hectare)
Arentc Average rental charges (US$/hectare)
Kmtown Mean distance to the nearest town (kilometre)
Trade Trade dummy variable, 1=positive price spread
Notes:
All monetary values are in 2004 US$ 
To compute the price spreads, the destination markets had to be defined and
the consumer price data in those markets had to be collected for the relevant
Increasing Returns to Marketing in Zambian Maize Markets
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reference periods (2000/01 and 2003/04). We define the destination market
relevant to each local market, or CSA, as the nearest district centre. In most cases,
this is the central market for the district in which the CSA is located. The CSO
routinely collects retail price data for agricultural commodities in 38 of the country’s
72 districts. We used these retail price data in the district market centres to
compute pcj. This study uses district-CSA combinations as the unit of observation.
However, a balanced panel was only possible in 33 districts and 198 CSAs. With
two years of data per CSA, our total sample size was 396 CSA-District
combinations or observations.13
As most of the sales of food crops take place during May through October, the
monthly district prices were averaged over this period for both 2000 and 2003.
The price spread between the district mean retail price of maize and the median
producer price in the relevant ith local market or CSA in time period t was then
computed as yit = pcit - pit.14 Table 1 summarizes the variables used in the empirical
analysis and their descriptions.
4. Results and discussion
Increasing returns in marketing may arise due to high fixed costs that traders face
in establishing contacts and transactional relationships necessary for operating
in a particular area. Bonaccorsi and Giuri (2001) stress that traders cannot
effectively participate in a market without making heavy investments in relational
activities. In the presence of these and other initial investments that cause high
fixed costs for traders, their per unit costs of marketing are expected to decline as
the volumes of trade rise.
Figure 1 presents cumulative distribution functions for the maize real price
spread in the two reference marketing seasons (2000/01 and 2003/04). The graphs
confirm that the bulk (at least three quarters) of the 198 local markets under study
had lower prices than their nearest district centres, a clear indication of the possible
existence of incentives to export surplus production. In the 2003/04 marketing
season, the proportion of local markets with positive farm-retail price spreads was
as high as 90%, compared to 75% in 2000/01. This trend is consistent with the
policy thrust towards progressively greater public sector involvement in the maize
subsector. Policy instruments such as fertilizer subsidies and output price supports
have created artificial incentives even in areas that are not agro-ecologically or
economically suitable for maize production (Tembo et al., 2009).
Gelson Tembo and Thomas S. Jayne
149
zambia journal edition 2_Layout 1  26/09/2011  20:46  Page 149
Figure 1. Cumulative distribution function for district-local market maize price
spread in Zambia
Descriptive statistics from the survey data indicate a significant reduction in
the rural households' reliance on purchases as a means to obtain staple food
crops. While on average a household purchased US$430 worth of staple food
crops in the 2000/01 marketing season, in 2003/04 it purchased only US$170
worth (Table 2). The shrinking numbers of maize deficit local markets seem to
discredit empirical estimation strategies that imply bidirectional trade flow of
surplus maize, including that from district centres to rural local markets. 
Table 2 presents a number of other descriptive characteristics for the markets
under study, comparing across trade direction stratum (communities with positive
farm-retail marketing margins versus those with negative ones) for each of the
two marketing seasons. In general, local markets with positive farm-retail maize
price spreads do not differ significantly from those with negative marketing
margins. Only land rental charges were significantly higher among positive-margin
markets in the 2003/04 season. This could be an indication of increased demand
for land triggered by increased public support.
Increasing Returns to Marketing in Zambian Maize Markets
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Table 2. Descriptive characteristics of Zambian local maize markets, 2000/01 and
2003/04 marketing seasons
2000/01 marketing season 2003/04 marketing season
Markets Markets Market Markets 
with with with with
negative positive negative positive 
price price l price price 
Variable description Overall spread spread Overall spread spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean
Median expenditure on staples (000 US$) 0.43 0.33 0.46 0.17 0.18 0.17
Per capita maize sales (mt) 0.61 0.63 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.59
Sales of all other crops (000 US$ per capita) 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.09
Average wage rate (US$/ha) 44.65 42.04 45.46 26.39 24.63 26.60
Median land rental cost (US$/ha) 49.68 55.75 48.09 28.78 24.24 29.35**
Mean distance to the nearest town (km) 33.25 34.45 32.88 33.83 29.48 34.37
Notes:
Significance of mean differences (t test): *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%
All monetary values are at constant prices (2004=100)
Table 3 presents the regression results for the correlated random effects
linear model with panel- and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors (Column
1), and the CRE tobit model (Column 2). Both models represent a very good fit of
the data as indicated by goodness-of-fit Wald χ2 statistics of 822 and 349,
respectively (p-values < 0.001). The null hypothesis that the time-averages of
time-varying variables are collectively not different from zero (the Mundlak-
Chamberlain hypothesis, H0: γ = 0) was strongly rejected with p-values less than
0.01 in both models. This suggests that time-varying unobserved heterogeneity
was severe. However, the contribution to the variance by the unobserved market
effects, σ2a , was not significant as demonstrated by a failure to reject the null
hypothesis that H0:ai = 0.
From Model I (Column 1), it is also clear that the relationship between the
price spread and the explanatory variables is significantly different between
markets with positive spreads and those with negative ones. On average, urban
(district)-rural (CSA) price spreads markets are wider by USD 60.2 in markets that
have positive margins wider price margins than markets with negative price
spreads (p-value < 0.001).
Gelson Tembo and Thomas S. Jayne
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Table 3. Regression Results for the Maize Price Spread (US$/mt) Between District
Markets and Rural Local Markets, 2000/01 and 2003/04 Marketing Seasons
CRE tobit marginal effects
Correlated 
random
effects (CRE) CRE tobit---
linear paramete ʚE(yitǀ yit>0) ʚΦ(zit)
Variable description model estimates ʚxit ʚxit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 1.958 73.58***
(7.28) (6.58)
Median expenditure on staple foods (‘000 US$) -1.058*** -1.275*** -0.767 -0.014
(0.31) (0.42)
Per capita maize sales in metric tons (own externality) -4.993** -11.66*** -7.122 -0.125
(2.26) (2.78)
Sales of all other crops in ‘000 US$ per capita (cross externality) 41.12*** 31.53 19.039 0.335
(14.0) (21.8)
Average wage rate in US$/hectare -0.213** -0.473*** -0.294 -0.005
(0.086) (0.098)
Mean distance to the nearest town (km) 0.0684 0.102 0.064 0.0011
(0.058) (0.067)
Trade dummy variable, 1=positive price spread 60.19***
(3.36)
Joint tests of significance (Wald Chi-square)
District dummy variables 133.59*** 216.55***
All time-averaged variables (H0: γ = 0) 32.56*** 36.72***
Goodness of fit Wald 822.79*** 349.39***
Number of observations 396 396
Number of local markets (CSAs) 198 198
Log-likelihood -1,598a -1,567
R-squared 0.67 -
Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels: * = at 10%, **
= at 5 %, ***= at 1 %.
Model selection tests based on Pollack and Wales' (1991) likelihood
dominance criterion (LDC) indicated that the CRE tobit specification fits the
variation in price spreads 30 times better than the linear model.15 This result
strongly suggests that the flow of trade is largely unidirectional from local
communities to district central markets and that little trade is observed when the
price spread is negative. 
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Both models indicate that own externality effects are inversely and
significantly related to the price spread (p-value <0.05). That is, the larger the
aggregate maize surpluses produced by farmers in the local communities, the
lower the gap between pcit and pij. A plausible explanation for this finding is that,
other things being equal, the presence of larger crop surpluses in a community
reduces traders’ per unit transaction costs, thereby providing them with incentives
to offer a relatively more attractive price to local farmers. Based on Model I, an
increase in maize aggregate supply in the local markets by 1 metric ton would
lead to a narrowing of the price spread by US$ 4.99 per metric ton. The marginal
effects of the CRE Tobit model indicate that a one metric ton increase in maize
aggregate supply would reduce the probability of the price spread being above
zero by 0.125 (or 14.8%) while reducing the expected price spread by US$ 7.12
per metric ton for those local markets with pcit - pit > 0. This margin-reducing effect
may help to induce virtuous cycles, in which lower price spreads are likely to
translate into farmers supplying more of the crop into their markets, which then has
additional margin-reducing effects.
Cross externality effects are significant only in the CRE linear model (p-value
< 0.001) but not in the CRE tobit model. Moreover, the positive sign observed in
the coefficient of the cross externality effect seems to suggest the existence of
scope diseconomies. This could be due to the challenges associated with handling
multiple commodities (e.g. quality verification for multiple commodities). That is,
there does not seem to be scope for combining maize with other field crops as a
way to reduce transaction costs. Rather, the existence of significant margin-
reducing own-externality effects and scope diseconomies implies that the market
for maize is highly specialized. This is consistent with what Emran and Shilpi
(2002) found about the rice market in Bangladesh. It also appears that areas that
are big producers of alternative field crops are not really producers of maize
surpluses; so much so that in areas where large surpluses of the former are
present, maize is insignificant and vice versa. 
However, rural areas with active local markets for staples – represented here
by the median per capita expenditure on staple crops – have lower margins than
do those without significant effective local demand. This makes sense as larger
effective demand is expected to raise local prices as well as to stimulate trade with
outside markets. According to the CRE linear model (Model I), an increase in the
median expenditure on staple food crops of US$1,000 will narrow the margin by
US$1.06. The CRE tobit model (Model II) shows that a US$1,000 increase in
median expenditure on staple foods would reduce the probability of the price
spread being above zero by 0.01 (or 1.2%) while reducing the expected value of
the price spread for those markets with positive price spreads by US$ 0.77.
5. Summary and conclusions
This article was motivated by the need for a better understanding of the existence and
effects of increasing returns to marketing in developing country agriculture. Increasing
returns in marketing may arise due to high fixed costs that traders face in establishing
Gelson Tembo and Thomas S. Jayne
153
zambia journal edition 2_Layout 1  26/09/2011  20:46  Page 153
contacts and transactional relationships necessary for operating in a particular area.
The presence of increasing returns would mean that low production surpluses in
rural farming areas may prevent the achievement of scale economies in marketing,
and contribute to a reinforcing state of underdevelopment in which traders’ costs are
increased by low marketed output, and farmers’ incentives to expand production for
the market are in turn impeded by high marketing costs. The presence of increasing
returns to marketing – i.e., marketing margins decline when local marketed surpluses
rise – has often been assumed to exist but has rarely been verified or quantified
using household survey data from developing countries. 
The article used a combination of household panel survey data and market
price information to investigate the presence of increasing returns to marketing in
an area of Africa characterized generally by weak infrastructure and high fixed
costs of trading. It extends the work on this topic by Emran and Shilpi (2002) in two
ways. First, using maize price data from rural communities and district markets in
Zambia, we were able to directly estimate the impact of increased community-
level farm surpluses on the size of farm-retail price spreads while controlling for
unobserved market heterogeneity. 
Results indicate significant own externality effects and insignificant cross
externality effects, implying that the Zambian maize market is substantially
specialized. That is, variations in the level of surplus production of other crops
have little effect on maize price spreads. Traders do not need - or are not able -
to bulk maize with other crops to meet the desired surpluses to reduce the costs
of maize trading. Yet the finding that variations in the level of surplus maize
production in a particular assembly market is associated with lower price spreads
between that market and the nearest urban wholesale market suggests a possible
virtuous cycle. Efforts to raise and/or bulk up production surpluses within a market
shed could reduce marketing margins and provide further incentives for small farm
commercialization. Also, the fact that unobserved market effects exert significant
systematic influence on the marketing margins highlights the need to fully identify
those sources of market heterogeneity in the design of market interventions. 
Despite their mixed record in many parts of the world, farmer cooperatives and
other forms of collective action may play an important role in helping to overcome
transaction cost-related impediments to the development of rural commodity
markets. By bulking up the small surpluses of geographically scattered farmers,
these marketing arrangements at least theoretically have the potential to reduce
the transaction costs that traders face in serving such areas, which may allow
upward pressure on producer prices in competitive markets. However, our results
indicate that for the case of rural maize markets in Zambia, such bulking initiatives
would be most successful if they are commodity-specific. The extent to which this
is the case in other developing areas remains an issue for further investigation.
Notes
This study was supported by USAID Zambia and by the EGAT and Africa Bureaus
of AID/Washington, through the Food Security III Cooperative Agreement. The
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corresponding author is Gelson Tembo at tembogel@gmail.com.
1. Different behaviours and different types of institutions – or rules of the game – emerge in the
market with the aim of helping to minimise transaction costs by promoting trust, reputation
and social capital (Gabre-Madhin, 2001; Bonaccorsi and Giuri, 2001).
2. These issues are important in countries that are characterised by millions of small farmers
producing small surpluses, because the presence of increasing returns in marketing could
warrant collective action and other institutional arrangements for aggregating supplies to
reduce the transaction costs of coordination between farmers and marketing firms. 
3. Suppressing, for clarity’s sake, the indices for the crop, j, and for the destination market.
4. This results from what is known as an incidental parameters problem. For a thorough
discussion see Wooldridge (2002:483-5). 
5. An alternative is to have Xi in place of X
_
i in the linear expectation of the conditional
distribution ciǀXi (Chamberlain, 1982, 1984); we use X
_ 
(Mundlak, 1978) to conserve on
parameters. For linear models, such as 3, the CRE estimator of coefficients on time-variant
regressors are mathematically identical to the fixed effects estimator, which is why we
describe them as “fixed-effects like” in the non-linear case.
6. The CRE estimator is efficient, unbiased, and consistent but only under the assumption of strict
exogeneity of regressors. Thus, only the time-averages of all but dit-1 are included in X
_
i.
7. A modified Wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity also confirmed the presence of group-
wise (or CSA-wise) heteroskedasticity (p-value < 0.001). Tobit models are inconsistent in
the presence of heteroskedasticity.
8. In total, Zambia has 72 districts, 4,400 CSAs and 17,000 SEAs. 
9. The CSA, and not the SEA, was the preferred unit as it provided a good sample size from
which to estimate local prices and other community variables.
10. Although the government sets prices, not all smallholder farmers actually sell at those prices.
This article uses actual prices received by the smallholders as the local market prices and
district market prices (collected monthly by the CSO) as retail prices. Preliminary analysis
indicates that there is a lot of variation in both these price series
11. Typically, the two surveys collected volumes and prices as much as possible exactly the way
the respondent said them. For example, the respondent could say he sold each 20-litre tin
of maize at ZMK25,000. That 20-litre tin is just a container and says nothing about the weight
of the maize when it is full. To obtain the weight in kilogrammes, we used a table of standard
conversion figures developed by the FSRP. The conversion lookup table, which was
developed by taking actual weights for different crops and different containers from around
the country, relates all the possible containers in which each crop is sold to the average
weight in kilogrammes when it is full. 
12. The CPI was used as a proxy for the producer price index (PPI) due to data limitations on
the latter.
13. There were a little over 11 CSAs sampled per district. 
14. Again suppressing the crop index j.
15. With 32 district dummy variables and 12 other variables, the Tobit model had a parametric size
(number of parameters) of 44. Because the linear model had an additional parameter to
estimate for the trade dummy variable, it had a parametric size of 45. Thus, taking n2 = 45 and
n1 = 44 and given the log likelihood values in table 3, it can be shown that L2-L1 = -30.874 and
that the lower and upper bounds of the LDC are (0.588, 1.075). Thus, the hypothesis with a
smaller parametric size (H1: Tobit) is preferred and the other (H2: Linear) is rejected.
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